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Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a severe mental
disorder affecting around 1% of the population.1 It is
associated with signiﬁcant psychiatric comorbidity,2
impairment in social function3 and a high rate of service
utilisation.4 Personality disorder as a whole is associated
with reduced life expectancy.5 People with BPD may engage
in self-harming behaviour as a way of regulating negative
affect, particularly at times of crises.6 Assessing decision-
making capacity in a patient with BPD who requires medical
treatment following an act of self-harm is particularly
challenging.7 In the overlap between the Mental Health Act
1983 and Mental Capacity Act 2005 (the Act), it is the
decisions around physical healthcare treatment without
consent, i.e. those that the Mental Health Act cannot be
used to enforce unless treatment is recognised as treatment
for mental disorder, that in our experience generate
considerable anxiety. This is particularly true in a general
hospital setting as exempliﬁed in the tragic case of Kerrie
Wooltorton.8
The Mental Capacity Act is the legal framework used in
England and Wales for assessing capacity. It also provides
protection to a clinician who makes decisions on behalf of
an incapacitous patient, providing its terms are satisﬁed and
the clinician is acting in the patient’s best interests.
Assessment of capacity is time- and decision-speciﬁc,
however, in our clinical experience there is inconsistency
surrounding the use of the Act with BPD patients. This is
partly the result of disputes relating to the nosological
status of personality disorder as a whole.7,9 Such disputes
are discordant with increasing knowledge about the
natural history of BPD and its neurobiological abnormalities
and treatability. In this article we explore the key reasons
for inconsistency on whether BPD has the potential to give
rise to the ‘impairment of, or disturbance in the functioning
of, the mind or brain’ criterion of the Act, as well as
highlighting the need for clearer guidance on the use of the
Act with such individuals.
Applicability of the Act in borderline
personality disorder
As indicated by Section 2(1) of the Act, patients must
demonstrate an ‘impairment of, or disturbance in the
functioning of, the mind or brain’ for the Act to apply -
sometimes known as the ‘diagnostic threshold’.
Applicability to patients with a psychotic illness or a
severe affective disorder is rarely questioned, presumably
because these conditions are clearly described and widely
accepted as constituting mental disorders that have the
potential to impair or disturb function.7 However, in one of
the few discussions of the impact of personality disorder on
competence to refuse treatment, Winburn & Mullen10 point
out that personality disorder, although classed as such
under the Mental Health Act 1983, ‘has always been
considered to be at the margins of what constitutes
mental disorder’. Although it is by no means an exhaustive
list, paragraph 4.12 of the Mental Capacity Act Code of
Practice11 does not include personality disorder among the
other conditions it recommends as having the potential to
cause impairment or disturbance in the functioning of the
mind or brain. Indeed, as recently as the past decade,
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lingering doubts about the nosological status of personality
disorders in general were still being voiced by senior ﬁgures
in academic psychiatry.9
Over the past 10-15 years, the empirical evidence base
for personality disorders in general and particularly for BPD
has expanded substantially. Robust longitudinal studies
have charted the natural history of BPD12 and shown that
while symptomatic improvement is common, enduring
impairment in social functioning3 is a deﬁning feature of
the condition. Cost of illness studies have shown that the
costs of managing people with BPD exceed the costs
associated with managing people with depression.4 Other
studies have shown that the life expectancy of people with
personality disorder is markedly reduced and that the loss
of lived years is at least equivalent to that seen in
schizophrenia.5 There is also growing evidence of
underlying neurobiological abnormalities associated with
BPD.13,14 Finally, the increasing number of well-conducted
clinical trials which show that effective treatment is
possible provides further evidence supporting the validation
of the construct of BPD.15
In summary, as a result of considerable research
endeavour, we now know that BPD is, without doubt, a
valid category of mental disorder. As such, it must be
considered ‘an impairment of, or a disturbance in, the
functioning of the mind or brain’. Therefore, not only is the
Mental Capacity Act framework applicable to people with
BPD, but it is clinically inappropriate not to consider its
relevance when assessing people with BPD. There is a need
for greater consensus regarding this, to eradicate the
assumption that capacity assessments, tout court, cannot
apply to such patients.7,11
Perhaps another reason why this assumption has been
so pervasive relates to Parsons’s notion of the ‘sick role’.16
This illustrates the link between illness and its social
beneﬁts: among these, the absolution of responsibility.17 The
doctor’s role is key, as it is the doctor who confers this role
on the patient and provides social sanction for receipt of
those beneﬁts.16 Doctors are often divided as to whether
patients with BPD can be thought of as being ill and thus
entitled to a sick role.9,18 As the Act requires the presence of
an ‘impairment’ or ‘disturbance in function’ to be applicable,
one might view its application to BPD patients as being
synonymous with sanctioning an adoption of the sick role.
Such a view may not sit comfortably with a clinician who
may view a volitional act of self-harm as being ‘manip-
ulative’.9,18
The issue of volitional control and, by inference,
manipulation, therefore seems the crux of the matter.
Pickard19 points out that it is hard to accept that patients
with a personality disorder completely lack control over
their actions. She qualiﬁes this by pointing out they ‘may
not always have full conscious knowledge of why they are
behaving as they do’.19 Similarly, Szmukler has speculated
that suicidal impulses may sometimes stem from ‘an inner
disturbance the [person] ﬁnds difﬁcult to describe’.7 The
question for clinicians is that, in situations where high-stakes
decisions must be made, how does the phenomenology of
BPD impair an individual’s ability to understand and reﬂect
on both the risks and beneﬁts of treatment, and also the
motivation underlying their behaviour?
How does BPD affect capacity?
Fuchs20 identiﬁed that, at the extremes of emotional
dysregulation, BPD patients become enveloped in that
mental state to the extent that they are unable to view
things objectively. Over time, repetition of this cycle leads to
the chronic feelings of emptiness that characterise the
disorder, meaning that patients ‘miss the experience of
agency or authorship of their life’.20 Broadly speaking, this
key concept can be illustrated in two general clinical
scenarios.
The ﬁrst is a patient presenting as an emergency at
the extreme of an episode of emotional dysregulation.
Self-harming behaviours may serve an affect regulation
function6 and assessment of capacity to accept or refuse
treatment following a severe episode of self-harm is a
common clinical scenario. The framework for decision-
making, per the Act, requires the patient to understand
the pros and cons of treatment for their condition. If the
self-harm is life threatening, accepting treatment would
therefore be life saving, and to refuse, by inference, a
decision likely to result in death.
To ‘use or weigh’ relevant information about options in
the process of deciding is the element of the capacity test
that causes most interpretative difﬁculty in BPD. As
Principle 4 of the Act states: ‘a person is not to be treated
as unable to make a decision merely because he makes an
unwise decision’. Deciding to refuse life-saving treatment
may be unwise, but it is not the decision per se that we are
assessing, rather how ‘accountable’ the patient is for the
decision.21,22 Elliot has argued that in depression, even
though patients may understand the risks, ultimately the
disorder may affect whether they ‘care’ about that risk, thus
reducing the ‘authenticity’ of the decision.22 If depression
can lead to a pathological lack of ‘care’ about one’s
own interests, could the drive to emotionally regulate via
self-harm lead to a pathological ‘resistance’ to acting in
one’s own best interests that robs BPD patients of decision
authenticity?
Research has suggested that key interpersonal schemas
in BPD include sadomasochistic behaviour, where patients
hurt themselves in an internalised ‘punitive parent’ mode.23
The relevance to treatment refusal here seems clear. In
addition, as Szmukler points out, any capacity assessment is
essentially a dynamic between the patient and the doctor.7
Refusal of the doctor’s recommendation could also be
viewed within this sadomasochistic paradigm. This is surely
the source of the sense of ‘manipulation’18 frequently felt by
doctors treating these patients.
The great trap in these scenarios is assuming that
refusal of life-saving treatment is equivalent to a wish to die
and an acceptable ‘unwise’ decision. While this may indeed
be the case in some instances, this de facto assumption
endangers the lives of some BPD patients, as in some cases
the decision to refuse per se may simply be a manifestation
of the disorder, rather than a carefully considered wish to
die. The risk to these patients is compounded by an
intolerance of ‘manipulation’ felt by the doctor, who in
turn may take this as evidence that the patient has full
insight into the situation and accept their refusal as an
unwise but capacitous decision. In summary, as a direct
consequence of the mental disorder itself, BPD patients may
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unwittingly become caught up in a destructive iatrogenic
cycle of harm.
A second clinical example which aptly illustrates the
lack of ‘authorship’ of life19 that may occur for people with
BPD while dealing with doctors has been provided by
Winburn & Mullen.10 They describe the case of a BPD
patient who was judged incapacitous to refuse a potentially
life-saving blood transfusion. Her decision to refuse
treatment was viewed as a consistent, chronic behavioural
pattern and overall constituted a ‘disturbed form of
engagement . . . rather than an effort to disengage’. Case
law reﬂects these views, as seen in the case of B v Croydon
Health Authority,24 where a young woman with BPD was
starving herself to the point where enforced nasogastric
feeding was considered. Lord Justice Hoffman wrote in his
judgment that he found it difﬁcult to conclude that the
patient had capacity, despite her seeming to have a good
understanding of the risks and options. It was this that made
him question whether her choice was truly autonomous,
because, while being able to make cogent and articulate
statements about her wishes, it was hard for him to deem
someone capacitous when she is ‘crying inside for help but
unable to break out of the routine of punishing herself’.
How this affects clinical practice
The assessment of mental capacity in BPD patients is
complex and may therefore cause clinicians signiﬁcant
anxiety where high-stakes decisions are to be made. It is
conceivable that such anxiety may lead to risk-averse
practices. In her review of suicide risk management in
BPD patients, Goodman25 highlighted the inﬂuence of
medico-legal concerns on clinicians, by referring to a
survey26 that had shown that 85% of clinicians working
with BPD patients had, within the past year, practised in a
way ‘that would relieve their anxiety over medicolegal risks’.
In our example of the BPD patient refusing life-saving
treatment following self-harm and where capacity is
marginal, risk-averse practice would presumably involve
erring on the side least likely to result in death, i.e. a
judgement of incapacity, detention and enforced treatment.
However, Pickard19 points out that it is particularly in
the interests of patients with BPD that we attribute
decision-making responsibility to them where possible, as
this is the basis of some of the most effective psychological
treatments for BPD, where self-control and mentalisation
development are key. Szmukler suggests that when capacity
could be argued from both sides, ‘one might conclude that
. . . the patient’s account, although not the one preferred by
the clinician, is an adequate one, and sufﬁcient to
demonstrate that the patient has capacity’.7 Law states
that ‘with regard to the degree of incapacity the nearer to
the borderline the more weight must in principle be
attached to [the patient’s] wishes and feelings’.27 In
application to BPD this would appear to imply that if the
incapacity is only marginal the patient should, in effect, be
approached as if with capacity.
So how do we balance over- and under-attributing
capacity to BPD patients in clinical practice? Buchanan’s
work28 is relevant to this problem. He describes that when
capacity is in doubt, we may vary our threshold for deciding
what constitutes true incapacity, based on the stakes of the
decision. Thus, when the negative consequences of a
decision are likely to be severe, the clinician would require
a more robust demonstration of capacity.28 In essence, the
clinician is balancing possible infringement of autonomy
with negative consequences of the outcome of the decision.
Ultimately, capacity is judged legally to be either present or
absent, but as Lord Donaldson pointed out in the case of
Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment),29 doctors should consider
whether the capacity that is there is ‘commensurate’ with
the seriousness of the decision.
One might argue that proportionality merely reﬂects
the clinicians’ increasing anxiety about higher-stakes
situations, thus not addressing the underlying problem:
that there is little consensus and guidance on whether and
how BPD may affect decision-making. Clearer guidance and
consensus on how BPD may affect decision-making abilities
in different clinical scenarios will reduce anxiety for
clinicians and may help the Act become more predictable
in its application.
Conclusions
Borderline personality disorder is a mental disorder. The
use of the law in treating patients with BPD should be
predictable and its application to clinical scenarios
reproducible. The current use of the Mental Capacity Act
2005 in assessing decision-making capacity in such patients
is lacking in these respects.
While BPD should be viewed as a mental disorder, this
only means the Act is applicable; it is not synonymous with
the view that people with BPD necessarily lack capacity for
decision-making or responsibility for their actions. The
psychopathology of BPD and speciﬁcally the way this affects
the ‘using and weighing’ element of decision-making
capacity is extremely complex and not acknowledged
widely enough either in clinical practice or within the
Mental Capacity Act itself. This leads to inconsistency in
patient care. Further research into this ﬁeld, along with
clearer clinical consensus and legal guidance, is urgently
required.
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